“It affects and involves us all, and what it needs is understanding, compassion and political will to come together and find real answers for the refugee plight. This has become a defining challenge of our times.” --- Filippo Grandi (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees)

The Rohingya crisis is rooted in the contentious issue of their nationality and citizenship. The Burma Citizenship Act of 1982 provided citizenship to anybody living in Burma who could prove that they had lived there before 1823, the year of the first British military war against Myanmar and a subsequent influx of people from India and China. As transnational relationships were frequent for many families of different ethnic groups and there was rarely paperwork to support whether a person had strong roots in Myanmar, the law was extremely troublesome. The 1982 citizenship law recognizes only eight ethnic groups as ‘citizens’ (Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Chin, Mon, Bamar, Rakhine, and Shan), denying a total of 135 ethnic groups in Myanmar, along with Rohingyas, the rights and privileges available to citizens. The Tatmadaw (Myanmar Army) has always rejected Rohingya calls for citizenship, and their leaders have argued that the current conflict has been fueled because the Rohingyas demanded citizenship. But according to historical reports, Rakhine and Rohingya people have coexisted in Myanmar’s (formerly Burma’s) Arakan area for many years. The latest military coup has worsened the situation for the Rohingya people. The issue regarding citizenship has not only led to the Rohingyas fleeing regularly but has also exacerbated hostile local conditions, reducing the possibility of their return to their homeland. On paper, from August 2017 till date, approximately 745,000 Rohingyas were forced to escape their homes in Myanmar’s Rakhine State due to armed attacks, widespread violence, and grave human rights violations. There were two unsuccessful attempts to persuade several thousand refugees to return, in 2018 and 2019, but those chosen were unwilling to participate in the process without sufficient assurances from the Myanmar government about their security, access to citizenship, and employment opportunities after their return. Partly in response to the violence, Bangladesh has imposed stricter restrictions on refugees, including restricting their ability to leave the camps, their access to the Internet, and their ability to communicate with local people. Others paid large sums to traffickers to embark on perilous boat trips to Malaysia, the second-largest Rohingya refugee population after Bangladesh, while others attempted to travel to Indonesia.

Nearly 30,000 Rohingya have also moved to Bhasan Char, a muddy island in the Bay of Bengal that the Bangladeshi government has spent hundreds of millions of dollars developing specifically to host up to 100,000 refugees. The Bangladeshi government and the UN high commissioner for refugees signed a memorandum of understanding in October 2021 on behalf of UN organizations working on the Rohingya refugee response. When the first refugees landed there, suspicions of forcible relocations surfaced. The main reason for those who do decide to transfer to Bhasan Char is probably to escape the deteriorating conditions in the Cox’s Bazar camps. The Bangladeshi government’s determination to move forward with the relocation of Rohingya to Bhasan Char shows a hardening of its stance toward the refugee population. Bangladesh made it plain from the start that, while having opened its borders to the desperate refugees in 2017, it would not permit them to remain there indefinitely and that, to host the Rohingya and assist their return to Myanmar, it would need international cooperation. The Bangladeshi people are currently unhappy and becoming impatient with the lack of advancement on repatriation. Public pressure on the Bangladeshi government to take a stronger approach has increased as a result of the surge in crime and violence in and around the camps. Dhaka is making life increasingly difficult for the refugees as it grows impatient. These limitations have sparked worries that the Bangladeshi government is trying to force refugees to move to Bhasan Char or, at the very least, return to Myanmar. Since the coup, the Rohingya have continued to be the target of discriminatory state policies. The military dictatorship has increased travel restrictions in some places, and the country’s economic collapse over the previous 18 months has made their situation even worse. The situation is still dire for the 600,000 Rohingya people of Myanmar, almost all of whom reside in Rakhine State, but there are at least some indications that public perceptions of them are changing. The military’s control of Myanmar makes repatriation appear impossible, but it's still necessary to make as much progress as possible, so Bangladesh will need to keep talking to the junta about it. By collaborating with counterparts in Myanmar civil society and the NUG, Bangladesh’s very active civil society, which includes its universities, think tanks, and NGOs, should do its lot to significantly impact policy and public sentiment toward the Rohingya in Myanmar. Due to the poor chances for returning home and the impossibility of integrating into Bangladeshi society given both public sentiment toward the Rohingya and the massive number of refugees, it appears progressively clear that third-country transportation ought to be a part of the spoken communication concerning sturdy solutions for this population. Dhaka has antecedently resisted this concept, saying that the chance of transportation would encourage additional Rohingya to cross the border into Bangladesh, which might ease the pressure on Myanmar to take back refugees. The time might be right for Bangladesh to review its policy and for foreign governments, notably within the West but also in Asia, to make it clear they can support Dhaka by accepting some refugees for voluntary transportation. At the same time, alternative countries hosting massive Rohingya populations, such as Malaya, the Republic of India, and Saudi Arabia, ought to reverse a worrying trend toward larger restrictions and threats to banish them to either Myanmar or Bangladesh. Although the Rohingya exodus was seen as a heavy humanitarian disaster, the international community did not exert pressure on the Myanmar government to alter its stance, permitting the government to point out no sign of bending in the face of the community’s suffering.

At this point, Jyotirmoy School of Law feels it is significant to address these complex issues through a platform. Hence, this seminar will mainly focus on social, economic and political issues relating to the Rohingiya crisis, its impacts on Asia and its geopolitics as well as the laws, policies of various countries of our continent along with the contemporary challenges like the ‘security concerns for the host nations’.

We invite contributions for presentation from academicians, legal professionals, researchers, activists and students of Law or of any other fields. Potential paper presenters are expected to submit the abstracts of their papers along with a cover letter clearly mentioning the full name designation (Maximum 250 words) by 25th November, 2019 and full papers (Maximum 3000 words including footnotes) on the above mentioned topic must be sent on or before 2nd December, 2019 by e-mail to anweshanseminar@jsl.org.in. All the papers must be typed in MS WORD file (Font: Times New Roman, Size: 12pt., Spacing: 1.5, Margin: l”inch on all side, References: in alphabetical order).
Information about the acceptance or otherwise will be sent by e mail only.In addition, a hard copy of the above is to be sent by post to the contact address given below. Presentation shall be dependent on the scrutiny by the committee.
Papers selected by the committee only can be allowed to be presented in the seminar. The selected persons will be eligible to fill-up the registration forms. Certificates shall be issued to all participants

Publication:

Selected research papers presented during the seminar will be published as an edited book with ISBN number. However, the decision of the editorial board will be final for selection of the papers to be published.

Jyotirmoy School of Law
Jyotirmoy Knowledge Park
Kalikapur, Sonarpur,
Kolkata – 743 330
West Bengal, India.
Ph: 03218 260079/ 80

E-mail ID of the convenors for sending Abstracts:
• Mrs. Manisha Chwoudhury (Convenor): manisha@jsl.org.in
• Ms. Soumy Roy (Co-convenor): soumiroy.adv@gmail.com
• Mr. Sagar Biswas(Co-convenor): advsbiswas07@gmail.com